Reconciling long-term cultural diversity and short-term collective social behavior by Valori, L et al.
Reconciling long-term cultural diversity and
short-term collective social behavior
Luca Valoria, Francesco Piccioloa, Agnes Allansdottirb, and Diego Garlaschellic,d,1
aDepartment of Chemistry, University of Siena, Via A. De Gasperi 2, 53100 Siena, Italy; bUniversity of Siena, 53100 Siena, Italy; cLorentz Institute for
Theoretical Physics, University of Leiden, Niels Bohrweg 2, NL-2333 CA Leiden, The Netherlands; and dCABDyN Complexity Centre, University of Oxford,
Park End Street OX1 1HP, Oxford, United Kingdom
Edited* by Robert Axelrod, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, and approved November 22, 2011 (received for review June 15, 2011)
An outstanding open problem is whether collective social phenom-
ena occurring over short timescales can systematically reduce cul-
tural heterogeneity in the long run, andwhether offline and online
human interactions contribute differently to the process. Theoreti-
cal models suggest that short-term collective behavior and long-
term cultural diversity are mutually excluding, since they require
very different levels of social influence. The latter jointly depends
on two factors: the topology of the underlying social network
and the overlap between individuals in multidimensional cultural
space. However, while the empirical properties of social networks
are intensively studied, little is known about the large-scale orga-
nization of real societies in cultural space, so that random input
specifications are necessarily used in models. Here we use a large
dataset to perform a high-dimensional analysis of the scientific
beliefs of thousands of Europeans. We find that interopinion cor-
relations determine a nontrivial ultrametric hierarchy of individuals
in cultural space. When empirical data are used as inputs in models,
ultrametricity has strong and counterintuitive effects. On short
timescales, it facilitates a symmetry-breaking phase transition
triggering coordinated social behavior. On long timescales, it
suppresses cultural convergence by restricting it within disjoint
groups. Moreover, ultrametricity implies that these results are sur-
prisingly robust tomodifications of the dynamical rules considered.
Thus the empirical distribution of individuals in cultural space
appears to systematically optimize the coexistence of short-term
collective behavior and long-term cultural diversity, which can be
realized simultaneously for the same moderate level of mutual in-
fluence in a diverse range of online and offline settings.
collective social phenomena ∣ homophily ∣ social influence ∣
sociophysics ∣ ultrametricity
How a society spontaneously organizes macroscopically fromthe microscopic, uncoordinated behavior of individuals is
one of the most studied and exciting problems of modern science
(1–3). Collective social phenomena are systematically observed in
several aspects of everyday life, including the onset of large-scale
popularity and fashion [both offline (4) and online (5–7)], the
existence of large speculative bubbles and herding behavior in
financial markets (8–10), the spontaneous emergence of order
in traffic and crowd dynamics (11), the properties of voting
dynamics (4, 12), the structure of countrywide communication
networks (3, 13, 14), individual specialization and the spreading
of cooperation, habits, fear, gossip, rumors, etc. (2, 11, 15). When
collective phenomena occur, large parts of a population turn
out to be globally correlated or synchronized as a result of the
combination of many local interactions, even if no centralized
mechanism takes place. Importantly, the collective outcome is
different from a mere superposition of noninteracting individual
behaviors, and contrasts the “representative agent” scenario
often postulated in economic theories (16). The different char-
acteristics, choices and behaviors of individuals, rather than being
‘averaged out’ in the long run and at a large scale, may in some
circumstances become amplified at the societal level (1).
The substrate for collective phenomena is being expanded by
the increasing connectedness and integration of people across the
world (17, 18), made possible on one hand by the steady enhance-
ment of communication technologies (18–21) and on the other
hand by the intensification of global trade, worldwide travel,
and international education (22–24). All these factors virtually
reduce physical and communication distances among people,
irrespective of their cultural traits. In particular, large-scale elec-
tronic platforms where people can exchange information with
unprecedented speed and breadth are triggering a major shift to-
ward effectively infinite-ranged social interactions (see SI Text,
Discussion). This naturally leads to the question of whether the
diversity of behaviors, attitudes, and opinions is destined to be
progressively reduced in the long run. Naively, one expects that
stronger and more frequent bursts of collective social phenomena
taking place on short timescales may gradually result in more
homogeneous cultural traits in the long term. However, the emer-
gence of group boundaries has preserved cultural diversity for
millenia across populations (25–27) and survived many technolo-
gical revolutions that extended the length and range of social
interaction (18–21). Moreover, recent studies of online behavior
suggest that, even in the virtual world, social influence massively
emerges (6) and determines large-scale collective phenomena
(7), but at the same time is observed to coexists with the systema-
tic presence of long-lived communities of people sharing similar
traits (28–30).
The above paradox is reinforced by the fact that similar me-
chanisms are believed to be among the key driving forces of both
collective social behavior (1, 6) and cultural convergence (31).
Various simplified models have been introduced to quantitatively
simulate the fate of cultural diversity and the dynamics of opi-
nions in large groups (2, 11). Rather than conveying a detailed
picture of reality, models of social dynamics aim at understanding
the effects that different mechanisms proposed in social science
may have when combined together and when taking place at a
large-scale level. In particular, the popular model proposed by
Axelrod (31) studies the combined effects of two key phenomena:
social influence [the observed tendency of social interactions to
favor convergence and consensus (32)] and homophily [the ob-
served tendency of culturally similar individuals to interact more
than dissimilar ones (33–35)]. The importance of the model
resides in showing that social influence and homophily do not
necessarily reinforce each other and determine a culturally
homogeneous society. In fact, the model suggests that the persis-
tence of cultural diversity in the long term is ensured by the in-
hibition of influence among dissimilar individuals, even if socially
tied. These results are enhanced by the introduction of an impor-
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tant generalization. According to assimilation-contrast theory
(36) [recently revived in the modelling literature under the name
of bounded confidence hypothesis (2, 37–39)], individuals are
likely to accept only moderate opinion changes and to reject
extreme ones. Quantitatively, when the opinions or cultural traits
of an individual are represented as a scalar or vector variable, the
bounded confidence hypothesis results in two individuals being
potentially influenced by each other only if the distance between
their associated variables is smaller than a certain threshold, re-
presenting the level of confidence or tolerance (2, 37–39). This
threshold, which in a simplified picture is assumed to have the
same value ω across the entire population, quantifies how suscep-
tible an individual is to possible cultural influences. According to
this scenario, two individuals can only influence each other if they
are both socially tied and culturally similar: the effective medium
of interaction is the overlap between the social network and the
cultural graph connecting pairs of sufficiently similar individuals
(see SI Text for an extended discussion). If introduced into the
Axelrod model, the bounded confidence hypothesis strengthens
the persistence of cultural diversity (38, 39) and makes it more
robust under destabilizing mechanisms such as cultural drift
(40, 41).
However, if plugged into other models of social dynamics (2, 9,
11), bounded confidence prevents information diffusion across
culturally disconnected groups, and therefore also implies a re-
duction of collective social behavior in the short term (we will
give an explicit example of this effect by simulating both short-
and long-term dynamics on random data). This appears to con-
firm that the coexistence of long-term cultural diversity and short-
term collective behavior is a paradox, which can only be solved by
invoking different mechanisms at different timescales. However,
this expectation follows from the naive assumption that the de-
tails of the initial underlying distribution of traits in cultural space
are essentially irrelevant to the final or asymptotic outcome of
cultural dynamics. This assumption is often implicit in our way
of imagining cultural convergence as taking place on otherwise
uniformly distributed traits, will little emphasis on what would
change if the distribution was actually heterogeneous. In models,
the assumption becomes explicit and indeed individuals are al-
ways initially assigned uniformly random traits. While many con-
tributions have studied how the process of cultural convergence
under social influence changes if different dynamical hypotheses
are introduced (2, 31, 37–50), little is known about the effects of
different initial cultural specifications. To fill this gap, here we
first perform an empirical analysis of the structure of high-dimen-
sional cultural vectors in a large set of individuals, and then use
such vectors as seeds for dynamical models. We show that, even
without postulating more complicated scenarios, the paradox
can be parsimoniously explained by an insofar ignored aspect of
real multidimensional cultural profiles; i.e., their nearly ultra-
metric distribution in cultural space.
Results
The Hierarchical Distribution of Individuals in Cultural Space. In order
to understand the effects of real, rather than completely random,
cultural specifications, we need to consider empirical data which
are however not already affected by social influence (which pro-
duces correlations among cultural traits). As we discuss in detail
in the SI Text, this leads us to the choice of the large Eurobarom-
eter dataset (51–53), the outcome of an official Europe-wide sur-
vey based on questionnaires filled during face-to-face interviews,
which allowed us to reconstruct the empirical multidimensional
vectors of more than 13,000 individuals across 12 European coun-
tries. The nature of the dataset (see SI Text for details) ensures
that we can obtain representative samples of vectors which are
maximally random under the constraint of reflecting a country’s
overall cultural characteristics, and at the same time unbiased by
social influence effects. The residual correlations, which are the
main focus of our analysis, can therefore be regarded as an in-
trinsic property of how individuals are empirically distributed
in cultural space, as opposed to completely random assumptions.
The multiple-choice nature of the questionnaire allowed us to
define, for each individual i in a given country, an F-dimesional
vector ~vi whose kth component v
ðkÞ
i represents the answer given by
i to question k in the survey (k ¼ 1;…F, where the number of
questions is F ¼ 161). For each pair i, j of individuals we defined
a normalized metric distance dij (0 ≤ dij ≤ 1) between ~vi and ~vj,
measuring the difference between the answers given by i and j. We
considered 13 groups, each of N ¼ 500 individuals: one group for
each of the 12 countries, plus a thirteenth group of 500 indivi-
duals sampled all across Europe.
In addition to real data, we considered two types of rando-
mized data which represent important null models providing in-
formative benchmarks throughout our analysis. A first type of
randomization (“random answers”) simply consists in defining
N random vectors, each obtained drawing F answers uniformly
among the possible alternatives. This simulates N individuals giv-
ing completely random answers to the questionnaire, and does
not depend on the empirically observed answers. This provides
a unique random benchmark against which all sampled groups
can be compared, and corresponds to the usual initial specifica-
tion in Axelrod’s model (31) and modifications (2, 38–43, 50). A
second type of randomization (“shuffled answers”) consists in
randomly shuffling, for each of the F questions in the question-
naire, the real answers given by the N individuals of the group
considered. In this case, different groups have different rando-
mized benchmarks, each characterized by its own probability dis-
tribution (determined by real data) of possible answers. This null
model is very important, as it preserves the number of times a
particular answer was actually given to each question (so it pre-
serves “more fashioned” answers for each group), but destroys
the correlations between answers given by the same individual
to different questions*.
We analyzed several properties of real and randomized data, as
a preliminary step before studying the impact of the empirical
structure on short- and long-term dynamics. In the SI Text we
report a detailed study of the cross-correlations among opinions
within individuals, an information which is not available in one-
dimensional studies. We found a pattern analogous to the “likes
attract” phenomenon: individuals with more beliefs in common
are more likely to agree on other opinions (strong positive cor-
relation), while dissimilar individuals tend to ignore, rather than
“repel,” each other (weak negative correlation). However, in this
case we have an evidence of a deeper mechanism, since we know
that individuals in our data are socially unrelated. Therefore,
rather than an effect of homophily and social influence, the ob-
served result is a signature of intrinsic interopinion correlations
within each individual. We also found that the observed “attrac-
tion” among opinions does not imply, as one would naively ex-
pect, that the empirical vectors f ~vig are closer to each other in
cultural space than shuffled data. Actually, the distribution of
intervector distances has the same average value in real and
shuffled data. Rather, the main difference is the variance of the
distribution: real distances are much more broadly distributed
than shuffled ones.
Higher-order differences between real and randomized data
can be characterized by performing a hierarchical clustering
algorithm of the vectors f ~vig, which represents the latter as leaves
of a dendrogram where culturally closer individuals have a lower
common branching point. We find (see Fig. 1A) that the dendro-
gram for real data is well structured in sub-branches nested within
*Note that in more traditional one-dimensional analyses where only a single opinion is
considered, the shuffling procedure would be impossible: shuffled data would be
equivalent to the original data, and the only possible null model would be the first
one we described (or one where the empirical abundances are modified arbitrarily).
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branches, indicating that cultural space is heterogeneously popu-
lated by dense communities of similar individuals, separated by
sparsely occupied regions. The hierarchical character of this dis-
tribution shows that denser regions are iteratively fragmented
into denser regions nested within them. This peculiar organiza-
tion indicates that the original distances are approximately ultra-
metric (54); i.e., the tree-like representation rendered by the
dendrogram is not just an artifact of the clustering algorithm,
but a natural property of the data. This means that the height
of the first branching point connecting two individuals i and j ap-
proximately corresponds to the original distance dij between ~vi
and ~vj. By contrast, the dendrograms for shuffled and real data
are trivially structured (see Fig. S2) with no well-defined internal
separation between different hierarchical levels. In this case the
dendrogram is not representative of the original distribution of
vectors, and is merely an uninformative outcome of the algorithm
which is forcing nonultrametric data into a tree-like description.
In such a situation, the vertical dimension of the dendrogram
loses it correspondence with the original intervector distances,
and provides a highly distorted image of the latter.
The Effects of Ultrametricity. The ultrametric hierarchy discussed
above has important static and dynamic consequences. As we
show in the SI Text, the branches of the dendrogram “cut” hor-
izontally at a distance ω coincide with the connected components
of the ω-dependent cultural graph we defined in the beginning.
The (normalized) size of the largest connected component repre-
sents a global measure of influence among individuals as a func-
tion of ω, while the density of links in the cultural graph
represents (for the same value of ω) a purely local meaure of
influence. We found that real data are always characterized by
higher levels of both local and global influence than shuffled
and random data (see SI Text). Different groups also show differ-
ences among themselves, and their global levels of influence re-
main significantly different even after standardizing (controlling
for) their local influence level. Therefore any process which de-
pends on the cultural distance between individuals might have
very different global outcomes even when taking place on locally
identical structures.
All the above results show that even randomly sampled indi-
viduals are not characterized by uniformly random cultural vec-
tors. While this is not surprising, the peculiar hierarchical
distribution implied by empirical interopinion correlations is
highly nontrivial, and unpredictable a priori. As we show in what
follows, the dynamics of opinions and culture is strongly depen-
dent on initial conditions, and the observed ultrametricity drama-
tically alters the predictions of models simulating both short- and
long-term dynamics. In particular, it determines a condition for
the coexistence of cultural heterogeneity and collective social
phenomena, thus solving the apparent paradox. Moreover, as
we discuss in detail in the SI Text, it constrains the dynamics
so severely that its outcome is nearly insensitive to the details
of the model considered. This result inverts the frequent expec-
tation that initial conditions are less relevant than model speci-
fications, and actually makes the latter less important (with the
advantage of reducing the arbitrariness that, in principle, under-
lies the mathematical definition of any model). Quite unexpect-
edly, a range of more complicated scenarios [such as models with
different interaction probabilities (2, 31, 38, 39), different net-
work topologies (2, 31, 37, 42), coevolution of networks and opi-
nions (43–47), cultural drift (40, 41, 48), higher-order interactions
(2, 38, 49), and external sources of information (50)] lead to
results that are essentially equivalent (or directly mapped) to
what is obtained simply assuming that individuals are subject
to dyadic interactions on a complete graph (see SI Text). We will
therefore illustrate our results in this simple case, which corre-
sponds to the assumption that social interactions are infinite-ran-
ged, and only limited by the bounded confidence hypothesis.
Short-term Collective Social Behavior. We first study the effects of
the empirical structure of real opinions on short-term collective
social behavior. We consider a simple prototypic model where, on
short timescales, cultural vectors do not evolve but nonetheless
determine the choices that individuals make under the influence
of each other. To this end, we extend the Cont-Bouchaud (CB)
model (9), originally proposed to model herding effects in finan-
cial markets, to a more general “coordination model” which
incorporates a dependence on real cultural vectors f ~vig (see
SI Text). Individuals are assumed to make binary choices such
as yes/no, buy/sell, approve/reject, etc. We can represent the
choice expressed by the ith individual as ϕi ¼ 1. The effects
of mutual influence and bounded confidence are modeled by al-
lowing pairs of individuals whose cultural distance dij is smaller
than a threshold ω (which is the only parameter of the model) to
exchange information before making their choices. As a result of
this information exchange, all the agents belonging to the same
connected component of the resulting ω-dependent cultural
graph (see SI Text) collectively “agree” on the choice to make.
If A labels a connected component of the graph, the choice of
all agents belonging to A is the same (ϕi ¼ ϕA ∀ i ∈ A), while dif-
ferent connected components make statistically independent
choices. We can imagine, even if this is not strictly necessary, that
the process is repeated several times and with no memory: ϕi may
first represent whether i liked or disliked an item, then whether i
liked or disliked a different item, etc. The key property is that ϕi is
short-lived; i.e., it represents any choice made over a timescale
much shorter than that required to modify the cultural vector
~vi. It is a spurious variable representing action, not culture.
A Initial (real) B Final (simulated)
C Initial (real) D Final (simulated)
Fig. 1. The hierarchical structure implied by interopinion correlations, and
its constraining effects on cultural evolution. (A) Dendrograms resulting from
the application of an average linkage clustering algorithm to the cultural vec-
tors f ~vig, represented as leaves of the tree along the horizontal axis, for the
Germany group; when we simulate the modified Axelrod model (see text),
real data are considered as the initial state, and a confidence level (corre-
sponding to the horizontal line below which the shaded region originates)
is imposed. (B) Due to ultrametricity, in the corresponding final state of the
model all the individuals within a common shaded branch in the initial den-
drogram collapse to the same cultural vector, with negligible effects on the
upper part of the dendrogram. (C) The same initial state as (A) is considered,
but a lower confidence level is imposed. (D) Correspondingly, the final state
of the model consists of a larger number of distinct cultural vectors, each
containing on average less individuals with collapsed vectors. Thus the num-
ber of distinct final vectors (the leaves of the final dendrogram) coincides
with the number of branches intersecting the horizontal line in the initial
dendrogram. If shuffled or random opinions are taken as the initial state
of the model (not shown), this is no longer true since the convergence of
cultural vectors also affects the dendrogram’s structure above the horizontal
line, signalling a lack of ultrametricity.
























The overall outcome of a single run of the process (e.g., the net
demand for a specific item) is the sum of individual preferences,










where the second sum runs over all connected components, and
SA is the size of component A. The sign ofΦ reflects the choice of
the majority, and a key property characterizing the outcome of
the model is the probability PωðΦÞ that the average choice takes
the particular value Φ, for a given value of ω. Following the pro-
cedure described in the SI Text, we computed PωðΦÞ for various
values of ω (from ω ¼ 0 to ω ¼ 1 in increments of 0.01) and for
all the 13 groups in our dataset (both real and shuffled), plus the
completely random set. In Fig. 2A we report the results for real
Germany data. As can be seen, there exists a critical value ωc (in
the case shown, ωc ¼ 0.14 0.01) such that, for ω < ωc, PωðΦÞ is
symmetric about zero (as for ω ¼ 0) and, for ω > ωc, PωðΦÞ has
two symmetric peaks. Right at ω ¼ ωc, PωðΦÞ displays a flattened
region. This behavior is typical of symmetry-breaking phase tran-
sitions. Here the order parameter of the transition is the most
probable value(s) Φ of Φ. This is shown in Fig. 2B, where we
also plot the behavior for shuffled and random data. As we show
in the SI Text, we found that the critical thresholds for shuffled
data (which are equal for all groups) are always larger than those
for real data (which are different across groups), and that the
ones for random data are even larger. This shows that empirical
interopinion correlations, which are responsible for the ultra-
metric distribution of individuals in cultural space, strongly
facilitate collective social behavior by systematically lowering
the resistance to coordination.
This simple model indicates that, depending on the local inter-
action range, different individual choices or actions can either be
“averaged out” and disappear at the macroscopic level or give rise
to a collectively coordinated behavior. Understanding this transi-
tion in real societies is one of the fundamental open questions of
modern social science (1). In economics, this problem is related
to whether it is legitimate to use the concept of “representative
agent” as an idealized individual that makes the average choice of
the society (16). Our simplified model, when simulated on real
data, suggests that both regimes are possible, and that a simple
local parameter can trigger very different global outcomes. In
particular, the variance of the collective outcome, which grows
with the separation between the peaks of PωðΦÞ, can either decay
to zero or be amplified macroscopically. These considerations in-
dicate that a good measure of the level of collective behavior














as a measure of short-term social coordination. The latter equality
in the above formula (see SI Text for a rigorous proof) states that,
intriguingly, CðωÞ is uniquely determined by the sizes fSAg of the
connected components of the underlying cultural graph obtained
for that particular value of ω, and is therefore actually indepen-
dent of the dynamical model considered. This quantity, which
ranges between Cð0Þ ¼ 0 (no coordination) and Cð1Þ ¼ 1 (com-
plete coordination), will be useful in what follows.
Long-term Cultural Diversity. We now take a dynamic perspective
and focus on a longer temporal scale over which the cultural vec-
tors themselves can change. In this case we use a modified version
(38, 39) of Axelrod’s model (31), which is designed to simulate
the evolution of vectors of cultural traits on social networks, again
in a way that real data can enter into the model. In an elementary
time-step, two individuals i and j are randomly selected. If the
normalized overlap oij ≡ 1 − dij (where dij is the above-defined
distance between the vectors ~vi and ~vj) is smaller than or equal
to θ, no interaction takes place. Otherwise, with probability equal
to oij, the two individuals interact: a component v
ðkÞ
j , chosen ran-
domly among the components where ~vi and ~vj differ, is changed
and set equal to i’s corresponding component: vðkÞj ¼ vðkÞi . Other-
wise nothing happens, and two other individuals are selected. In
the allowed final configurations, any two cultural vectors are
either completely identical or separated by a distance larger than
ω≡ 1 − θ, and the average hNDiω (over many realizations) of the





is a convenient way to measure the long-term cultural diversity as
a function of ω. A more detailed description of the model can be
found in the SI Text.
We ran several realizations of the model, by taking both real
and randomized cultural vectors f ~vig as the starting configura-
tion. As we show in the SI Text, we find that real data are those
that achieve the largest level of long-term cultural heterogeneity.























Fig. 2. At a critical confidence level, a spontaneous breaking of choice sym-
metry occurs. (A) When our “coordination model” is simulated on real data
(in the example shown, the Germany group), we observe an abrupt change in
the probability PωðΦÞ of a collective outcome at a critical confidence value ωc .
For ω < ωc, individual choices are uncorrelated and sum up to a vanishing glo-
bal outcome Φ ¼ 0, at which PωðΦÞ has a single peak. For ω > ωc, local inter-
actions result in global correlations that spread across the entire system, and
amacroscopically coordinated output, whose probability is peaked about the
two nonzero values ΦðωÞ, emerges. Right at ω ¼ ωc , PωðΦÞ displays a flat
region typical of critical phenomena. (B) The most probable value of Φ is
the order parameter of the phase transition. For ω < ωc it is vanishing, while
for ω > ωc it branches into the two symmetric valuesΦðωÞ. In addition to the
results for real Germany data, here we also show the results for shuffled and
random data. Real data always have a lower critical threshold than rando-
mized data, indicating an enhanced possibility to behave collectively. All
the other groups show the same behavior.
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sible (hNDi ≈NC) indicating that cultural convergence is con-
fined within the initial connected components, each of which
eventually becomes a single cultural domain. By contrast, in ran-
domized data there are less final cultural domains than initial
connected components, indicating that the latter often “merge”
into larger cultural domains. The reason for the remarkably dif-
ferent behavior of real and randomized data is, once again, the
ultrametric character of the former. As illustrated in Fig. 1, ultra-
metricity implies that the branches obtained cutting the real-data
dendrogram at some value of ω will collapse into a single cultural
vector. This means that the initial structure of the dendrogram
above ω will be “frozen” and unaffected by cultural evolution.
This confines cultural convergence locally within the lower
branches. By contrast, in randomized data the lack of ultrametri-
city implies that branches are not well separated, so that the local
convergence of vectors within a branch reduce the separation of
the branch itself from nearby branches. Thus in this case branches
are unstable, and often merge modifying the entire structure
globally.
Combining the above findings with our previous results about
collective behavior highlights the remarkable effects of ultrametri-
city. Given a group of individuals, we measured both the (initial)
short-term social coordination CðωÞ defined in eq. 2 and the
(final) long-term cultural diversity DðωÞ defined in Eq. 3 for var-
ious values of ω. Then we plotted DðωÞ versus the value CðωÞ ob-
tained for the same ω, as in Fig. 3. If we look at random data, we
retrieve the naive result that the coexistence of cultural heteroge-
neity and social collective behavior is impossible, since we have
either D ≈ 0 or C ≈ 0. By contrast, real cultural vectors simulta-
neously allow high levels of both short-term coordination and
long-term diversity, including the approximately balanced regime
C ≈D ≈ 1∕2 which in the case shown is achieved for the moderate
influence level ω ≈ 0.17. Shuffled data follow an intermediate
curve, showing that both the heterogeneous frequencies of real
opinions and the correlations among the latter play a significant
role in enhancing the coexistence of diversity and coordination.
Note that, for real data, as the branches (below the threshold
ω) of the dendrogram merge under the effect of cultural conver-
gence, the cultural graph acquires more and more links until its
initial connected components eventually become fully connected
cliques. However, the number and sizes of such connected com-
ponents (obtained for that value of ω) will remain unchanged†.
Therefore, if we repeat the short-term coordination process at
any frequency during the long-term cultural process, we will al-
ways obtain the same value of CðωÞ: the amplitude of collective
social phenomena will not be decreased by cultural convergence.
Seen from another perspective, this indicates that the persistence,
or even an increased frequency, of collective behavior does not
directly imply a reduction of cultural diversity. Thus, surprisingly,
we find that empirical hierarchical correlations simultaneously
enhance collective behavior and sustain cultural heterogeneity.
The incompatibility of these two phenomena, which holds for
random data, breaks down for real-data.
The above results were obtained assuming infinite-ranged so-
cial interactions. Online platforms bypassing offline social ties are
modifying the traditional scenario and leading us closer to this
extreme setting. Nonetheless, as we discuss in the SI Text, our re-
sults are surprisingly robust to changes in the dynamical rules of
the model considered. This robustness suggests that, even if on-
line interactions are tremendously expanding the substrate for
short-term collective social behavior, they are not necessarily
going to suppress long-term cultural diversity. It also indicates
that, despite the fact that the structure of both offline (55–57)
and online (28–30) social networks is intensively studied, our
understanding of cultural dynamics is still severely limited by
our little knowledge of the large-scale organization of real socie-
ties in multidimensional cultural space. These findings highlight
the scarce predictive power of models that consider random spe-
cifications, and show the unique importance of empirical analyses
of high-dimensional cultural vectors offering the possibility to ex-
plore cross-correlations among opinions and their consequences.
Conclusions
By using a large and detailed dataset, we have characterized the
empirical properties of the large-scale distribution of individuals
in multidimensional cultural space. We found that real interopi-
nion correlations organize individuals hierarchically and ultrame-
trically in cultural space, a result which is not retrieved when
randomized or one-dimensional opinions are considered. By
using simple models, we showed that ultrametricity has profound
and nontrivial consequences on short- and long-term cultural dy-
namics. In the short term, we found the existence of a symmetry-
breaking phase transition where collective behavior arises out of
purely local interactions. The critical threshold of this transition is
remarkably lower in real data than in randomized cases, indicat-
ing that ultrametricity enhances short-term collective behavior.
However, in the long term the same ultrametric property sup-
presses cultural convergence by restricting it within disjoint do-
mains, implying a strong sensitivity to initial conditions. These
opposite effects imply that, whereas in random data the coexis-
tence of short-term coordination and long-term diversity is unfea-
sible, in real data it is strongly enhanced and can be achieved in a
broad region of parameter space. Indeed, real data appear to op-
timize the coexistence of both phenomena. As another effect of
ultrametricity, these results are surprisingly robust to changes in
the details of the particular model considered: even more com-
plicated theoretical scenarios would lead to a similar outcome.
Thus the apparent paradox of the coexistence of short-term col-
lective social behavior and long-term cultural diversity might
have, as a simple and parsimonious explanation, the empirically
observed hierarchical distribution of individuals in cultural space.
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Fig. 3. Phase diagram summarizing our results. The long-term cultural diver-
sity D is shown as a function of short-term social coordination C for real,
shuffled and random data. If random cultural vectors are considered, cultural
heterogeneity and collective behavior are mutually excluding: one has either
D ≈ 0 or C ≈ 0. This approximately corresponds to the traditional situation ex-
plored when considering a random graph of interaction among individuals.
By contrast, real cultural vectors simultaneously allow high levels of both
short-term coordination and long-term diversity, including the approxi-
mately balanced regime C ≈ D ≈ 1∕2. Shuffled data follow an intermediate
curve, showing that both the heterogeneous frequencies of real opinions
and the correlations among the latter play a significant role in enhancing
the coexistence of diversity and coordination in the real world.
†Since we expect ultrametricity to be a robust property of real cultural traits also in other
situations, it would be very interesting to test this prediction on real data reporting
the evolution of culture. If we imagine to track the dynamics backwards in time, we also
expect that the number and sizes of connected components will be preserved. Since social
influence only modifies the lower branches of the dendrogram, the upper structure
must be inherited from previous stages. This structure is exactly what we interpret as
the residual cultural correlations that are entangled with social groups from the
beginning of human history (see SI Text).
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SI Text
Framing our Case Study. In this section we make general considera-
tions that help framing our case study correctly. We first discuss
how social influence, homophily, and bounded confidence are be-
lieved to affect social dynamics, and how offline and on-line en-
vironments are expected to contribute differently to the process.
Then, we explain why these considerations lead us to the choice
of the Eurobarometer data (1–3), and in particular its 1992 edi-
tion (Eurobarometer 38.1: “Europeans, Science and Technology—
Public Understanding and Attitudes” (1)), as an appropriate data-
set for our analysis.
Social networks and cultural graphs: the on-line shift. As we men-
tioned in the main article, the bounded confidence hypothesis
states that two individuals are potentially influenced by each
other only if the distance between their cultural variables (or vec-
tors) is smaller than a certain threshold ω (4–6). Thus, while so-
cial influence takes place on a social network connecting
individuals, bounded confidence involves a different graph, that
we denote as the cultural graph, where pairs of individuals sepa-
rated by a distance smaller than the confidence ω are connected
by “cultural channels,” irrespective of whether they are neighbors
in a social network. When combined together, these hypotheses
imply that the actual network of interactions is given by the over-
lap between social ties and (confidence-dependent) cultural
channels. If sij and cijðωÞ denote the elements of the adjacency
matrix of the social and cultural network respectively (equal to
1 if a link between vertices i and j is there, and 0 otherwise),
the overlap network is described by an adjacency matrix with en-
tries aijðωÞ ¼ sijcijðωÞ, where cijðωÞ ¼ 1 if dij < ω and cijðωÞ ¼ 0
if dij > ω.
Models that simulate the evolution of societies must therefore
be complemented by empirical analyses characterizing both so-
cial networks and cultural graphs. However, while a huge litera-
ture is devoted to the study of real networks formed by social ties
(using both traditional small-scale surveys (7) and more recently
large-scale communication data (8, 9)), little is known about the
empirical properties of those formed by cultural channels. As a
consequence, when considering models of opinion dynamics, so-
cial networks have been so far considered as proxies for the actual
interaction graphs; i.e., aij ≈ sij, which amounts to assume cij ≈ 1
(or equivalently an unbounded confidence ω ¼ þ∞) for all pairs
of individuals. This assumption is helpful in the traditional offline
situation where social ties are expected to be dominant over cul-
tural channels, for instance when social groups are formed inde-
pendently of the cultural traits of people (e.g., acquaintances
made in public schools). However, it prevents our understanding
of the opposite extreme, i.e. when people look for culturally si-
milar peers, that they do not know initially, to interact with (for
instance by joining an open discussion group on a focused topic of
interest). In such a situation the empirical knowledge of cijðωÞ
may become even more important than that of sij. While these
nonsocial interactions used to represent only a secondary means
of opinion diffusion up to some years ago, they are now becoming
more and more pervasive as novel electronic platforms are being
developed and used at a large scale (10–16). Indeed, in recent
years many new possibilities of interaction have rapidly emerged,
such as the exchange of opinions through the WWW (on-line for-
ums, blogs, discussion groups, etc.) and other media. In these
platforms, people already interested in a topic search new peers
(who they may never meet physically afterwards) to discuss with,
experiencing novel ways by which opinions can interact. If the
opinions under investigation regard technical or specialized to-
pics, on-line interactions can be even stronger than those occur-
ring through direct knowledge, as virtual communities gather
together people with oriented and focused interests, who often
recognize each other as the most natural and qualified peers
to share ideas with, even if no direct knowledge exists be-
tween them.
The above picture suggests an extension of the idea of homo-
phily, according to which “likes attract,” to an on-line setting (17).
Indeed, recent empirical studies of on-line communities (12) con-
firm that even in such context “social” interactions produce stable
groups which are strongly connected internally and sparsely con-
nected across, as predicted by the “strength of weak ties” hypoth-
esis (18) and confirmed empirically in the offline case even at a
society-wide level (8). When additional on-line possibilities of in-
teraction are considered, cultural channels may become the
dominant means of interaction, as people with similar interests
are more likely to access the same platform(s) and exchange opi-
nions more frequently than culturally dissimilar individuals. In
this opposite extreme, the social network through which opinions
can in principle interact is virtually extended to a complete graph
(i.e., sij ¼ 1 ∀ i, j) where everybody is connected to everyone else
(in social space, the interaction becomes infinite-ranged). Cultur-
al graphs therefore become a natural proxy for the actual inter-
action graph: aijðωÞ ≈ cijðωÞ. Despite its increasing importance,
our understanding of this novel type of long-range opinion dy-
namics, which bypasses social ties and is dominated by the struc-
ture of real opinions and cultural graphs, is incomplete.
Our analysis bridges this gap by using the Eurobarometer (1–3)
data which reports the opinions, beliefs and attitudes of thou-
sands of Europeans. These data allowed us to produce cultural
graphs where we investigated the outcome of (socially) infinite-
range, on-line-like dynamics on both short and long timescales.
An unexpected outcome of our analysis is that the empirically
observed ultrametricity of the distribution of individuals in cultur-
al space poses severe constraints on the dynamics of opinions. In
particular, besides making short-term collective social behavior
compatible with long-term cultural diversity (as we discuss at
length in the main article, with additional details in this SI file),
ultrametricity also implies that a number of more complicated
scenarios, going beyond our initial assumption of a complete
graph of social interaction and introducing more sophisticated
dynamical mechanisms, can be easily mapped to the results we
find in our simple setting. Therefore our choice of simple models
and infinite-ranged social interactions actually encompasses a
more diverse range of interesting situations. This is discussed
in detail in the section More Complicated Scenarios at the end
of this SI file.
The Eurobarometer dataset.Our aim is to understand the effects of
realistic, rather than completely random, cultural traits on the
outcome of social and opinion dynamics. Since neighbors in a so-
cial network tend to have similar characteristics, and this may par-
tially be already a product of homophily, a problem of circularity
arises whenever one tries to assess whether such similarity is the
cause or the consequence of a social tie being there. For this rea-
son, in our analysis we need to consider, as the initial state of
dynamical models, a realistic cultural specification which is
neither completely random, nor already trivially generated by
the mechanism we want to study. We therefore need to access
the opinions of a set of real individuals who do not know each
other and are well separated socially.
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For this reason, we focused on the Eurobarometer dataset (1–
3), a large project that is specifically designed to survey, through
questionnaires filled during face-to-face interviews, several be-
liefs, attitudes, and opinions across Europe. The Eurobarometer
survey makes use of sampling protocols ensuring that individuals
are selected avoiding the bias due to (among other factors) social
closeness. It is also designed in such a way that the target popula-
tion is a representative sample in terms of individual character-
istics such as age, gender, SES (socioeconomic status), etc. These
conditions guarantee that we can regard the Eurobarometer data
as a stochastic realization of cultural specifications which, rather
than being completely random as ordinarily happens in models,
reflect the cultural characteristics of real societies through ob-
served statistical weights. In other words, the data are maximally
random under the constraint of reflecting a country’s overall cul-
tural characteristics, and unbiased by social influence effects
(producing convergent cultural traits) that might be already pre-
sent if the individuals were sampled nearby in a social network.
Of course, simply because the sampled individuals are part of
the same society and share basic habits and attitudes, correlations
between the same cultural traits across different individuals are
still present in the data. These dependencies include similarities
induced by potential indirect interactions; i.e., paths of social ties
connecting individuals through intermediate neighbors not pre-
sent in the data. But such residual correlations are exactly what
we desire as a starting configuration, and are the main object of
our empirical analysis. Since humans belong to social groups from
the very beginning of the history of mankind, trying to get rid of
this unavoidable source of “baseline” similarity would imply an-
other circular argument leading us to the distant (in time and re-
latedness to the present study) problem of the origin of culture
itself. This observation also conclusively shows that completely
random specifications of cultural traits are in any case inappropri-
ate as seeds in models because we cannot even regard such spe-
cifications as a sort of “primordial” features that precede human
interactions.
Several editions of the Eurobarometer survey exist, which dif-
fer in the nature and subject of the questions, in the target po-
pulation (the sampled individuals are different at each round),
and in the number of target countries (due to the temporal in-
crease of the number of European member states). For our pur-
poses, these major structural changes between successive
snapshots impede the use of different time points as a way to con-
sistently track the evolution of opinions in a well-defined set of
individuals. This limitation highlights the desirability of designing
future surveys and/or experiments that allow us to explicitly keep
track of individual changes in a fixed set of opinions for the same
group of people. However, as discussed, it is possible for us to use
a single snapshot if the data as the initial condition for dynamical
models, and study how the empirical properties of real cultural
data change the results that are obtained when standard random
specifications are used. This leaves us the freedom to select,
among the available snapshots, a particularly convenient one.
We chose the 1992 snapshot for two reasons. First, this early year
in the dataset rules out the possibility of on-line interactions
among the sampled individuals, since at that time the Internet
was still in its infancy, and no extensive use of the WWW was
possible. Thus, besides offline social interactions, we can also ex-
clude on-line contacts. Second, the subject of the 1992 survey
[Eurobarometer 38.1: “Europeans, Science and Technology—Pub-
lic Understanding and Attitudes” (1)] minimizes, as we now show,
the effects of selective exposure to media and leaders presenting
similar patterns of opinions (such as political parties, nonscien-
tific articles in newspapers, etc.), which are deliberately beyond
the scope of our analysis.
The expectation that the scientific opinions surveyed in 1992
are relatively independent of political beliefs or social identities
(with respect to other Eurobarometer editions such as “European
Parliamentary Elections,” “Relations with ThirdWorld Countries
and Energy Problems,” “Immigrants and Outgroups in Western
Europe,” etc.) is confirmed in the official report (1) summarizing
the results of the analysis of the dataset. Citing from that source:
“This report presents the results of a major Community-wide opi-
nion survey carried out in 1992 on behalf of the European Com-
mission concerning the Public Understanding of, and attitudes
towards, Science and Technology. […] Eurobarometer is a regu-
lar Community-wide survey of opinion on a large number of is-
sues of interest to the European Union. A sample of over 13,000
Community citizens, representative of the total population of the
Member States, were interviewed on subjects of science and
science policy with some emphasis on environmental issues.
[…]” The main findings are summarized below:
• A large majority of EC citizens (70 per cent) watches the news
on television on a daily basis. While less popular, the news in
daily papers and on the radio still attracts the daily interest of
nearly half of the Community population.
• Compared with the results of 1989, over 50% (or very close to
it) of the populations of the same six Member States consult all
three news sources on a daily basis: Denmark, Germany, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
• Scientific news items turn out to be the ones in which EC
citizens are most interested. With the exception of “medical
discoveries,” this interest diminishes as people get older.
• It turns out that Europeans in general are convinced that the
level of information they have reached with regard to a number
of issues in the news is no match for their interest in these same
issues. Particularly where scientific themes are concerned, very
few people consider themselves to be very well informed.
• A strong positive link exists, however, between people’s level of
interest in scientific issues and their self-estimated level of
informedness on these issues.
• As to Europeans’media use which is specifically geared toward
scientific information, the television again plays a major role.
Taking the regular and occasional viewers together, 59% of
Europeans do watch television programs on science and tech-
nology. Almost half (45%) read articles on science in newspa-
pers, and only one out of every five (21%) is to be found
reading scientific magazines. There seems to be a direct link
between the easiness of the medium and the respondents pay-
ing attention to science and technology related stories on it.”
The above findings have two important consequences for our
analysis. First, they suggest that, for the individuals in the data,
the main sources of scientific information are mass media which
are uniformly accessed on a regular basis by the entire population
(mainly television and newspapers), rather than specialized med-
ia accessed heterogeneously by diversely interested niches. This
implies that all the individuals in the sample are directly exposed
to a common source of scientific knowledge, which obviously de-
termines some level of cultural convergence not due to actor-ac-
tor interactions. Even if this type of convergence is not explicitly
modeled in our study, we can reasonably expect that scientific
sources in mass media tend to attract all opinions in a common
direction, and that this effect prevails on the opposite tendency of
media to polarize around multiple centers, which is usually domi-
nant for other topics such as politics. Thus all our results have a
clear (and more correct) interpretation in terms of the effects of
actor-actor interactions that take place on top of a common uni-
form “background” convergence (see a more rigorous discussion
in the last subsection of this SI file). Second, it seems that the
Europeans in the survey are all interested in scientific topics,
but on the other hand think that their level of informedness
on the latter is not sufficient. A high level of interest and a limited
confidence in one’s knowledge suggest that, on the topics consid-
ered, these individuals are sufficiently open to the influence of
other people’s opinions. This indicates that one of the implicit
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assumptions in models of opinion dynamics, i.e., that people can
be potentially influenced on the topic considered, is realized in
this case study.
As we discuss below and in the main article, we used the multi-
ple-choice answers to theEurobarometer questionnaire as away to
reconstruct the “cultural vectors” of the individuals in the sample.
From such vectors, we computed the cultural distances for all pairs
of individuals. This procedure leads us again to discuss the nature
of residual correlations in the data, this time in terms of the cor-
relations between different traits within each cultural vector. That
is, we have to make some considerations regarding the cultural
“dimensions” covered by the Eurobarometer survey. Our defini-
tion of cultural distance (see below) implicitly assumes that differ-
ent components of the vectors are a priori independent, or in other
words that, irrespective of possible ex-post correlations between
answers to different questions (that we observe and study), differ-
ent questions are independent of each other in their ex-ante
formulation. As a counterexample of highly (but trivially) corre-
lated data, imagine a maximally redundant questionnaire made
by many replicas of the same question: in such a case, the vectors
are effectively unidimensional (unless individuals give different
answers when the same question is asked two or more times).
Our unavoidable assumption of independence, while not easily
verifiable, is however largely justified by the fact that the Euroba-
rometer data are collected through face-to-face interviews. This
type of survey, when conducted on a large scale, is very expensive
and time consuming. Therefore, unlike other sources of data (such
as automated downloads of behavioral or cultural information
from the Internet), face-to-face interviews require that question-
naires are carefully designed in such a way that, given the total
number of questions (i.e., the total cost of the survey), the maxi-
mumpossible amount of information is obtained fromthe answers.
This leads us to the expectation that the questions in the survey are
maximally nonredundant and independent of each other, and
motivates us to proceed further with our analysis.
More Details on the Analysis of Data. In this section we provide ad-
ditional details, with respect to the main article, about how we
reconstructed real multidimensional opinions from empirical
data, how we measured interopinion correlations, and what is
implied by the ultrametric structure we observed.
Definition of cultural vectors and distances. As we mentioned, the
1992 dataset reports the results of face-to-face interviews where
more than 13,000 individuals (from the 12 European countries*
that were part of the European Community in that year) were
asked to fill a questionnaire containing several multiple-choice
questions. Raw data were originally arranged in a SPSS spread-
sheet file† of N ≈ 13;000 rows, where each row i reported the
(numerically coded) answers of the ith individual to all the multi-
ple-choice questions. A small number of such questions regarded
demographic data (such as gender, age, etc.), while the remaining
F ¼ 161 questions concerned the true topic of the survey. We
therefore discarded demographic data, and transformed the “cul-
tural” data contained into the F aswers given by each of the N
individuals into N F-dimensional vectors f ~vig, using the same re-
presentation as in Axelrod’s model (19). Each component vðkÞi of
these vectors was given a value such that the corresponding con-







was in the range [0,1], with dðkÞij ¼ 0 representing i and j giving an
identical answer to question k, and dðkÞij ¼ 1 representing i and j
giving opposite answers. For “metric” questions (6), where an-
swers were possible in an equally spaced scale of Qk possibilities,
the maximum information is retained by mapping the original an-








and defining dðkÞij ≡ jvðkÞi − vðkÞj j. For nonmetric questions (asso-
ciated toQk unordered possible alternatives), “opposite answers”
simply means “different answers,” and we therefore mapped the
possible values of vðkÞi toQk arbitrary symbols and defined d
ðkÞ
ij ≡ 1
if vðkÞi ¼ vðkÞj and dðkÞij ≡ 0 otherwise. If all questions were non-
metric, this choice would be equivalent to dij ¼ 1 − oij∕F where
oij is the overlap (number of components with identical value)
between ~vi and ~vj, a commonly used notion of cultural similarity
(19) as mentioned in the main article. Note that for binary an-
swers (such as “yes”/“no”) the metric and nonmetric definitions
coincide.
Each individual in the data belongs to one of the 12 Member
States. This information allowed us to generate groups of indivi-
duals sampled either from the same country, or from different
ones. We labeled different groups of individuals with different
Greek letters (α, β,…), and used the notation i ∈ α to indicate
an individual i belonging to group α. In order to deal with samples
of equal size, we selected N ¼ 500 individuals per country‡ and
generated 12 groups accordingly. This reproduces a situation
where, for instance, people with the same language join a med-
ium-sized on-line discussion group mediating electronic, nonso-
cial interactions mentioned above. Similarly, it mimics individuals
that are physically “put together” to participate in a discussion
group or to a social experiment. Finally, this choice allows us
to establish an upper bound for the cultural homogeneity pre-
dicted by the “traditional” dynamics taking place on any possible
social network connecting the same individuals. We also gener-
ated an additional thirteenth group with N ¼ 500 individuals
sampled from all the 12 European countries, and denoted it as
the Europe group. This reproduces a situation analogous to
the one described above, but where several individuals across
Europe can form a group irrespective of their nationalities—
e.g., using a common language such as English.
Measuring interopinion correlations. Our multidimensional data
allowed us to investigate cross-correlations among opinions, an
information which is not available in one-dimensional studies.
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F2
[S2]*In alphabetical order: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK.
†Citing from the official report (1): “… like other Eurobarometer surveys, the raw data are
available in machine-readable form at the Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung,
Koln Universitat, Bachemer Strasse 40–5000 Koln-41, Germany (fax: (49) 221.476.94.44)
and the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor—Michigan
48104-1248, USA (Fax : (1) 313.763.13.46). The Commission warmly invites researchers
to take the opportunity to explore this data”. On-line sources of the data also exist, such
as http://einstein.library.emory.edu/eurolinks and http://www.cessda.org/index.html.
‡The dataset contains a sample of approximately 1,000 individuals per country, except Lux-
embourg (500 individuals) and Germany (2,000 individuals aggregating two sets of 1,000
individuals, one for East Germany and one for West Germany according to the division
existing in 1992). Thus 500 is the maximum size we can take if we want samples of equal
size without discarding any country.
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where h·iij∈α denotes an average over all pairs of individuals in
group α. From the above matrix it is possible to obtain the inter-







and range between −1 (perfect anticorrelation) and 1 (perfect
correlation). The correlation ρðklÞα tells us whether small (large)
differences between the answers given to question k imply small
(large) differences between answers to question l, for a given
group α. A color plot of the correlationmatrix is shown in Fig. S1A
for the group sampled from Germany data, which is a reference
case throughout our analysis (similar results are found for all the
other sampled groups). As can be seen, there are several pairs of
opinions ðk;lÞ characterized by strong positive correlations
(ρðk;lÞα ≈ 1), but only a few pairs with weak negative correlations
(ρðk;lÞα ≲ 0). The predominance of positive correlations indicates
that, in general, two individuals i and j giving similar/different an-
swers to question k (small/large dðkÞij ) tend to give similar/different
answers to question l as well (small/large dðlÞij ), while the opposite
outcome (small dðkÞij and large d
ðlÞ
ij ) occurs much less frequently.
As we show in Fig. S1B, the interopinion correlation matrix for
shuffled data lacks any structure, indicating the absence of statis-
tically significant correlations (obviously, the same is true for ran-
dom data).
The observed correlations have important effects on the dis-
tribution of individuals, i.e. of the vectors f ~vig, in cultural space.
We find (see Table S1) that the average interindividual distance
μα ≡ hdijiij∈α of random data is larger than real data, while it is
easy to show theoretically (and confirm by looking at the mea-
sured values) that real and shuffled data always have the same
value of μα, i.e., μα;real ¼ μα;shuffled. This means that the observed
“attraction” among opinions does not imply, as one would naively
expect, that the empirical vectors f ~vig are closer to each other in
cultural space than shuffled data.
However, real and shuffled data differ significantly in other
properties of the distribution of vectors in cultural space. A first
difference is that real distances are much more broadly distrib-
uted than shuffled ones. This can be inspected by measuring
the intragroup variance
σ2α ≡ hd2ijiij∈α − hdiji2ij∈α ¼ ∑
k;l
σðk;lÞα [S4]






since σðk;kÞα;shuffled ¼ σðk;kÞα;real and σðk;lÞα;shuffled ¼ 0 for k ≠ l, while for real
data we have





where the last inequality comes from the observed positivity of
∑k≠lσ
ðk;lÞ
α;real. As can be seen from Table S1, σα;real is roughly twice
as large as, and more variable than, σα;shuffled. Therefore, even if
the distribution of intervector distances has the same average va-
lue in real and shuffled data, real distances are more broadly dis-
tributed than shuffled ones. A second difference is that, as shown
in Fig. S2 and discussed in the main article, real vectors are ap-
proximately ultrametrically distributed in cultural space, while
shuffled and random ones are not. This means that the broader
distribution of real distances (with respect to shuffled ones) is im-
plied by the ultrametric structure, characterized on one hand by
an increased frequency of both nearby vectors (representing
individuals within the same branch of the dendrogram), and
on the other hand by an increased frequency of distant ones (re-
presenting individuals belonging to different branches). By con-
trast, shuffled data generate vectors with the same average
distance but more uniformly and nonultrametrically distributed
in cultural space.
Link density and largest connected components. The ultrametricity
of real intervector distances (documented in the main article) im-
plies that if we “cut” the dendrogram of cultural vectors at some
height ω we obtain a set of disconnected branches, within which
individuals are separated by a cultural distance smaller than ω,
and across which individuals are separated by a distance larger
than ω. In other words, we obtain the connected components
of the cultural graph defined by linking pairs of individuals sepa-
rated by a distance lower than a certain threshold ω. The concept
of bounded confidence implies that individuals belonging to dif-
ferent connected components of the cultural graph, even if linked
by a social tie, cannot interact (neither directly nor indirectly).
Therefore, in a fragmented cultural graph information (intended
as mutual influence) can only diffuse locally. A necessary condi-
tion in order to have a global spread of information is that cul-
tural channels form a giant connected component spanning (a
finite fraction of) the N individuals in a given group. This implies
that the fraction sαðωÞ of vertices spanned by the largest con-
nected component for a given value of ω represents the largest
fraction of individuals in group α that can potentially influence
each other, through either direct or indirect interactions, if the
confidence threshold is set to ω. This lead us to choose sαðωÞ
as a global measure of potential influence, capturing how local
interactions combine together at a large-scale level. It is also im-
portant to consider a purely local measure of influence, i.e., the
average probability that any two individuals can influence each
other through a direct interaction. To this end, we also considered
the density f αðωÞ of realized cultural channels, i.e., the fraction of
pairs of individuals in group α closer than ω [which is nothing but
the cumulative density function (CDF) of the distance distribu-
tion]. The resulting curves are shown in Fig. S3 A, B. For both
quantities, we observe large differences between real and rando-
mized data. In particular we find that, for a given value of α, real
data are characterized by higher levels of local and global influ-
ence than shuffled and random data. In order to understand
whether the differences among the curves in Figs. S2A and
S2B can be simply traced back to overall differences in the aver-
age values (μα) and variances (σ2α) of the intervector distances, in
Fig. S3 C, D we show f α and sα when plotted as a function of the
standardized parameter z≡ ðω − μαÞ∕σα. We find (see Fig. S3C)
that all the f αðzÞ plots collapse onto a single universal curve,
which is indistinguishable from the cumulative density fun-
ction (CDF) of the standard Gaussian distribution f 0ðzÞ≡
∫ z−∞dxðe−x
2∕2Þ∕ ffiffiffiffiffi2πp . In other words, in each group α the distances
are normally distributed, with group-specific mean μα and var-
iance σ2α. This means that all the empirical differences in link den-
sity among groups are taken care of after rescaling the distance,
so that the control parameter z completely specifies the density of
realized cultural channels of any group. Thus, if cultural channels
were placed uniformly among individuals as in a homogeneous
random graph, one would also observe an analogous universal
collapse of the sαðzÞ curves and of any other topological property.
By contrast, as can be seen in Fig. S3D, this approximately occurs
only in the shuffled case, but not for real data. This result indi-
cates again a nontrivial distribution of real cultural vectors, and
singles out differences across the sampled groups that are not
simply explained in terms of an overall variability. In particular,
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the universality of the link density function observed in Fig. S3C
does not imply a universal structure of connected components,
due to correlations between pairs of edges generated by the cor-
relations between distances. In other words, even after standar-
dizing the local level of mutual influence, real data continue to
differ significantly in their global level of influence. Therefore any
process which depends on the cultural distance between indivi-
duals might have very different global outcomes even when taking
place on locally identical structures.
It is important to note that, for ultrametric data, f αðωÞ coin-
cides with the fraction of pairs of cultural vectors within the same
connected branches, when the dendrogram is cut at the height ω.
By contrast, for randomized data both f αðωÞ and sαðωÞ are no
longer in relation with the structure of the dendrogram cut at
a given point in the vertical dimension, since the latter does
not represent the original distances, due to the lack of ultrame-
tricity. This important property has remarkable consequences for
the outcome of dynamical models defined on real data, as dis-
cussed in detail in the main article and in the following sections
of this SI file.
More Details on the Dynamical Models Considered. In this section we
provide additional details about the two dynamical models we
used in order to simulate short-term collective social behavior
and long-term cultural convergence.
The modified Cont-Bouchaud model. In its simplest formulation, the
Cont-Bouchaud (CB) model (20) considers a population of indi-
viduals (in the financial jargon, agents) that can make a binary
choice between buying or selling an asset traded in the market.
We can represent the choice expressed by the ith agent as
ϕi ¼ 1. Binary choices are the simplest possibility considered
also in other models of social processes, such as voting dynamics
(21). For our purposes, we interpret ϕi as a short-lived variable
which represents the choice or action of agent i (e.g., whether i
likes or dislikes an item). It is not a cultural variable (e.g., a uni-
dimensional opinion), because we assume culture and opinions to
evolve over a longer time scale (and this will be modeled using the
modified Axelrod model). In the CB model, the effects of mutual
influence are modeled by introducing a random graph through
which agents can exchange information before making their
choices. As a result of this information exchange, all the agents
belonging to the same connected component are assumed to col-
lectively agree on the choice to make. Therefore, if A labels a
connected component of the graph, the choice of all agents be-
longing to A is the same (ϕi ¼ ϕA ∀i ∈ A), while different con-
nected components make statistically independent choices.
The key result is that the probability distribution of the aggregate
choice of all individuals (which in the CB model is the aggregate
demand determining the price change of the asset) crucially de-
pends on the topology of the interaction graph. In particular, if
the connection probability p is set at the critical value pc ∼N−1
(for N → ∞) of the phase transition giving rise to the giant con-
nected component, the distribution of the sizes of connected
components acquires a power-law form, which in turn implies
a power-law distribution of price returns similar to the empirically
observed ones. Other values of p yield different outcomes. In the
limit p ¼ 0 (empty graph) all agents make independent choices
and the distribution becomes Gaussian. By contrast, for p ¼ 1
(complete graph) all agents always make the same choice and
the distribution is double-peaked.
In order to study the effects of the nontrivial distribution of
individuals in cultural space, we extended the CB model to a
more general “coordination model” which incorporates a depen-
dence on real data. In particular, we introduce a more realistic
mechanism allowing culturally similar agents to make similar
choices. To take this aspect into account, we assume that each
agent is described by a cultural vector f ~vig and that agents inter-
act, rather than on a random graph defined by a value of p, on the
cultural graph defined by a value of the confidence ω. Again,
agents within the same connected component are assumed to
make collectively the same choice, while agents belonging to dif-
ferent components make statistically independent actions.
The overall outcome of the process (e.g., the result of the sur-
vey/referendum/election) is the sum of individual preferences,






whose sign reflects the action of the majority. If the choices of all
agents are independent (ω ¼ 0), Φ is the sum of N uncorrelated
random variables with finite variance and, as follows from the
Central Limit Theorem, normally distributed. In such a case, if
the individual binary probabilities are equal (i.e., the events ϕi ¼
þ1 and ϕi ¼ −1 are equiprobable), then the probability PωðΦÞ
that the average choice takes the particular value Φ is symmetric
about the most probable valueΦ ¼ 0. If ω > 0,Φ can be rewritten





where now A labels the components, ϕA ¼ 1 is the choice of all
actors in component A, and SA is the size of A. Now, a crucial
point is that even if each connected component makes one of
the two choices ϕA ¼ 1 with equal probability, and hence the
distribution PωðΦÞ is still symmetric about Φ ¼ 0, the symmetry
breaks spontaneously at some critical threshold ωc.
To see this, we computed PωðΦÞ in the following manner. For
each group of individuals in our data, and for a given value of ω
(from ω ¼ 0 to ω ¼ 1 in increments of 0.01), we identified the
connected components, assigned each of them one of the two
choices randomly, and computed the resulting value of Φ. We
repeated this procedure 500,000 times on each sampled group
and measured PωðΦÞ as the normalized histogram of the values
obtained. As reported in the main article, we found a critical va-
lue ωc marking the transition from a single-peaked to a double-
peaked shape of the distribution PωðΦÞ. The above analysis
provides a method to determine with small indeterminacy
(Δω ¼ 0.01) the threshold value ωc for each particular, finite
group under study. We repeated our analysis on each of the
13 sampled groups (real and randomized) and obtained the cor-
responding critical thresholds ωc  Δω (see Fig. S4). Note that
smaller (larger) values of ωc require smaller (larger) levels of in-
fluence between individuals in order to trigger collective beha-
vior. Therefore ωc represents a novel measure of the resis-
tance of a social group to act collectively. Importantly, we found
that the thresholds for shuffled data are always larger than those
for real data, and that the ones for random data are even larger.
This shows that empirical interopinion correlations, which are re-
sponsible for the ultrametric distribution of individuals in cultural
space, strongly facilitate collective social behavior by systemati-
cally lowering the resistance to coordination. While for shuffled
and random data all thresholds are equal within errors, the entity
of the enhancement of collective behavior in real data varies sig-
nificantly across the sampled groups and determines nonuniver-
sal values of the thresholds. This implies that even two randomly
sampled social groups (for instance one in Italy and one in Por-
tugal) with the same size and under the same level of mutual in-
fluence may evolve to opposite collective states (coordination or
heterogeneity) if the critical thresholds for the two groups differ.
In general, ωc also represents a fundamental threshold for any
dynamical process dependent on cultural data. Any mechanism
taking place within a cultural distance smaller than ωc will not
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propagate through the whole network, while if the interaction
range is larger than ωc the information can percolate the entire
system.













which establishes a tight relation between network topology
and the level of collective social behavior in the model. If, for
a given value of ω, we denote the expected value of Φ as
hΦiω ¼ ∑ΦPωðΦÞΦ and its second moment as hΦ2iω ¼
∑ΦPωðΦÞΦ2, the variance σ2ωðΦÞ is defined as
σ2ωðΦÞ≡ hΦ2iω − hΦi2ω: [S10]
For simplicity, in what follows we drop the dependence of all
quantities on ω. For a fixed value of ω, the sizes of the connected
components of the network are given by fSAg, and determine the
aggregate choice Φ through Eq. S8. Since Φ is a sum of the ran-





















where σAB denotes the covariance between the choices ϕA and ϕB
of two different connected components A and B, and σ2A is the
variance of ϕA. Now, since
σ2A ≡ hϕ2Ai − hϕAi2 ¼ 1 [S12]
and since different connected components make statistically in-
dependent choices, it follows that
σAB ≡ hϕAϕBi − hϕAihϕBi ¼ δABσ2A ¼ δAB [S13]
where δAB ¼ 1 if A ¼ B and δAB ¼ 0 if A ≠ B. Thus the variance






which proves the last equality in Eq. S9.
Note that, technically, a critical threshold is defined only for
infinite systems, and most of the methods available to measure
its exact value in other models make use of an ideal thermody-
namic limit. However, here we are interested in determining the
parameter value that drastically changes the behavior of an intrin-
sically finite system. An extrapolation to an infinite number of
individuals would make any reference to the outcome of real so-
cial processes, and to empirical data, vanish. By contrast, the
method we use has an easily interpretable meaning even in
the finite case. Moreover, as we now show, in the infinite size limit
it would yield the exact value of the critical threshold. Note that
for ω ¼ 0 there are N connected components of size SA ¼ 1 (all
vertices are isolated) and therefore σ20ðΦÞ ¼ 1∕N (the results of
the Central Limit Theorem are recovered). In the opposite limit
ω ¼ 1, the network is a single connected component of size
SA ¼ N, which yields σ21ðΦÞ ¼ 1. Thus the social coordination




→ 0 (no collective be-
havior) to Cð1Þ ¼ 1 (perfect collective behavior). For generic va-
lues of ω note that, since ∑ASA ¼ N, the expression for σ2ðΦÞ in
Eq. S14 has the form of an inverse participation ratio. This means
that σ2ðΦÞ≃ 1∕n if the sum over A is dominated by n terms of
approximately equal size. In particular, σ2ðΦÞ≃ 1 if there is
one dominant connected component, while σ2ðΦÞ≃ 1∕N if each
connected component trivially contains only one vertex. This re-
sult rephrases the connection between the shape of PðΦÞ and the
underlying network topology: when there is no giant component,
the width of PðΦÞ is σðΦÞ≃ 1∕ ffiffiffiffiNp → 0, while when the giant
component is there the width of PðΦÞ has the finite value
σðΦÞ≃ 1. Thus when there is no giant component there must
be a single peak, while the presence of two peaks at finite distance
necessarily implies the presence of the giant component. In such a
case, σðΦÞ gives an estimate of the separation between the peaks.
Importantly, these results remain valid as N goes to infinity,
therefore our method to compute ωc as the value marking a spon-
taneous symmetry breaking (from single-peaked to double-
peaked) in the probability PωðΦÞ provides a consistent way to de-
fine a “critical” value, which technically is defined only for infinite
systems, even for our inherently finite data. For infinite systems,
our method would yield the correct value of the critical threshold.
Other finite-size techniques would require assumptions about
how topological quantities scale with network size. While for net-
work models [such as the Erdős-Rényi random graph (22)] it is
possible to derive these assumptions, for real systems this is not
possible.
The modified Axelrod model. In the original version of the Axelrod
model (19), N individuals (in social science jargon, “actors”) sit-
ting at the vertices of a social network are represented as vectors
of cultural traits (or features), that evolve through discrete steps.
In an elementary time-step, an individual i and one of his neigh-
bors (say j) are selected. Then the normalized overlap oij ∈ ½0;1
between their cultural vectors is computed as the fraction of iden-
tical components (note that the overlap is related to the cultural
distance dij through oij ¼ 1 − dij). With probability equal to oij,
the two actors interact: one of j’s traits, chosen randomly among
the set of traits where i and j differ, is changed and set equal to the
corresponding trait of i. Otherwise nothing happens, and two
other actors are selected. These rules implement the two basic
mechanisms of social influence (neighboring actors tend to con-
verge culturally) and homophily (similar individuals interact
more frequently). The Axelrod model leads to the important con-
clusion that these two mechanisms do not necessarily reinforce
each other leading to a culturally homogeneous society. In fact,
the model predicts that diversity is preserved: when two indivi-
duals become completely different (zero overlap), they no longer
interact. Thus in the allowed final configurations, two neighbor-
ing actors are either completely identical or completely different,
and the society is split into cultural domains of identical vectors,
with no overlap between adjacent domains. The average hNDi
(over many realizations) of the number ND of different domains
in the final stage, or equivalently the fraction hNDi∕N, is a con-
venient way to measure the predicted cultural diversity as a func-
tion of the model parameters.
As for the CB model, for our purposes it is important to in-
corporate real data into the Axelrod model. In this case, con-
venient generalizations have already been proposed. While in
the original model traits were nonmetric, a modification bring-
ing us closer to real data is the introduction of metric features
and the consequent redefinition of cultural distance dij as a me-
tric distance between cultural vectors (6). Another important
variant introduces the effect of bounded confidence: Flache
and Macy (5) introduced a threshold θ such that, if the overlap
is smaller than or equal to θ, no interaction takes place. Other-
wise, it takes place with probability oij (the original version of
the model is recovered if θ ¼ 0). Clearly, θ has exactly the same
meaning as 1 − ω, where ω is the confidence we introduced
above. The threshold compensates the effect that, as the number
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of features grows, the presence of completely different pairs of
agents becomes unlikely. It also allows us to reproduce more
realistically the fact that individuals are uninfluenced by each
other if they are different enough, not necessarily on each
and every opinion they have§.
The above modifications allowed us to use the empirical cul-
tural vectors (rather than commonly assumed uniformly random
vectors) as the starting configuration, and study the final diversity
predicted by the model. In order to simulate long-range on-line-
like dynamics, we assumed that the social network is a complete
graph. However, as discussed in the last section of this SI file,
many more complicated choices either reduce or map to this sim-
ple case. Since we never found more than one individual with ex-
actly the same cultural vector, the initial number of cultural
domains was always N ¼ 500 for each sampled group. Using
the same definition of cultural distance as above, we simulated
the modified Axelrod dynamics on the real cultural vectors as
a function of the threshold θ. In Fig. S5A we report the average
number hNDiω of different cultural domains in the final state of
the dynamics, as a function of ω ¼ 1 − θ for real, shuffled and
random opinions. As can be seen, for large values of θ (small
ω) the final fraction of culturally homogeneous domains is finite
(at the extreme θ ¼ 1 there is no evolution from the starting con-
figuration and the initial vectors remain all distinct), while for
small values of θ (large ω) the same fraction is of order 1∕N
(and vanishes at the extreme θ ¼ 0 corresponding to the ordinary
Axelrod model). This means that the final cultural diversity de-
creases as ω increases. With respect to real data, the curves for
shuffled and random data are moved rightward. Naively, if com-
bined with our previous results, this finding appears to confirm
the expectation that larger cultural diversity is only reached in
a regime (small ω) where short-term collective behavior is weak
or absent, and conversely strong collective behavior can only exist
for large values of ω which suppress cultural heterogeneity in the
long run. Moreover, this appears to apply equally to real,
shuffled, and random data.
However, this conclusion is incorrect. In Fig. S5B we show the
average number hNDi of final different cultural domains versus
the numberNC of initial connected components in the underlying
cultural network, both obtained for various values of the thresh-
old ω and for the three usual cases of real, shuffled, and random
data. We find that, for a given value ofNC, real data are those that
achieve the largest level of long-term cultural heterogeneity
(value of hNDi). Indeed, for real data the realized value of
hNDi is the largest possible¶ (hNDi ≈NC) indicating that cultural
convergence is confined within the initial connected components,
each of which eventually becomes a single cultural domain. By
contrast, in randomized data there are less final cultural domains
than initial connected components, indicating that the latter of-
ten “merge” into larger cultural domains.
More Complicated Scenarios.When using real data as seeds for the
models, we assumed that each individual can interact with every-
one else, if sufficiently similar culturally. As we mentioned, this
corresponds to the assumption that the social network (combin-
ing on-line and offline interactions) connecting the N individuals
of a given group α is a complete graph. Also, we assumed that
direct actor-actor interactions are the only possible source of
changes in opinions, and that they obey specific mathematical
rules dictated by the dynamical model considered. However, in
both respects our results are actually more general, since it turns
out that many other model assumptions would lead to similar out-
comes. To show this, we conclude with a discussion of several
more complicated scenarios that one could introduce, including
models with different interaction probabilities (5, 6, 21), different
network topologies (4, 19, 21–23), coevolution of networks and
opinions (17, 24–27), cultural drift (28, 29), higher-order interac-
tions (5, 21), and external sources of information (30). Despite
their sophistication, in many cases these models can be easily
related to our simple approach. The following discussion shows
that the observed approximate ultrametricity of cultural data has
the surprising effect of constraining the dynamics of even quite
complicated models so dramatically that their outcome becomes
essentially equivalent, or directly mapped, to what we obtained
using simple dyadic interactions on a complete graph.
Different interaction probabilities. The rules of the modified Axel-
rod model described above, when defined on a complete graph,
can be compactly rephrased in terms of the following probability
that at a given time step two actors i and j interact:
pij ¼ oijΘðoij − θÞ [S15]
where oij ¼ 1 − dij is the normalized distance-based overlap be-
tween the cultural vectors ~vi and ~vj, and ΘðxÞ is the Heavyside
step function defined as ΘðxÞ ¼ 0 if x ≤ 0 and ΘðxÞ ¼ 1 if
x > 0. Now, let us still make the complete-graph assumption,
but let us wonder to what extent the results we obtain using
the modified Axelrod model are dependent on the above specific
form of the probability pij (5, 6, 21). Indeed, any modified
probability ~pij of the form
~pij ¼ f ðoijÞΘðoij − θÞ [S16]
[where f ðoijÞ is an increasing function of oij] would equally imple-
ment the bounded confidence hypothesis (~pij ¼ 0 if oij is smaller
than a threshold) and the homophily mechanism (above thresh-
old, a larger oij implies a larger ~pij). The effect of changing the
form of f ðoijÞ on the results is a different relative rate of interac-
tion between actors with oij > θ (even if pairs with larger/smaller
oij will still interact at a higher/lower rate, and the ones below
threshold will still not interact). For a generic distribution of
vectors in cultural space, this may change the shape and compo-
sition of the cultural clusters that gradually coalesce in the system,
and in the end this may have an uncontrolled effect on the final
average number of cultural domains hNDiω obtained for a given
value of ω ¼ 1 − θ. However, if the distribution of cultural vectors
is ultrametric as we approximately find empirically, then the dif-
ferent rate of interaction will only affect the pairs of actors found
within the same branch of the dendrogram, if the latter is cut at
the “height” 1 − θ. Now, remember that for real data we found
that the average final number of cultural domains is hNDi ≈NC,
i.e., different such branches collapse to the same cultural state,
but do not influence each other. If the same initial ultrametric
configuration is considered, a modification of the relative rates
of interaction may change the temporal order with which actors
within a given branch collapse to the same final state, but will still
not mix different branches. Therefore, since the initial number
NC of such branches is independent of f ðoijÞ and only depends
on θ, the same is true for the final number hNDi of cultural do-
mains. This shows that, if the initial cultural specification is ultra-
§We also note that it can compensate for the arbitrariness of the number of features ap-
pearing in the cultural vectors: two identical cultural vectors may result actually different
if additional features are considered, making the concept of zero overlap not well de-
fined. This is particularly important when dealing with real-world opinions such as our
questionnaire data: adding just one more question to the questionnaire cannot change
the nature of cultural evolution.
¶As we mentioned, in real data ultrametricity implies that the initial connected compo-
nents are entire branches of the dendrogram, and are therefore completely connected
cliques. Since in a clique everyone can interact with everyone else, all individuals in the
same component will eventually converge to the same cultural vector. Also note that it is
extremely unlikely, for high-dimensional vectors such as the ones in our analysis (F ¼ 161),
that two distinct connected components will end up with the same cultural vector by
chance. Thus, for real data, the maximum value of hNDi is NC .
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metric, the outcome of the modified Axelrod model is surpris-
ingly robust to changes in the definition of pij.
Social networks with given topology.We now consider the effect of
specifying, instead of a complete graph, a given social network of
interaction (4, 19, 21–23) with adjacency matrix elements sij (con-
sistently with our notation in the first section of this SI file). With
this choice, the probability of interaction in the modified Axelrod
model becomes
pij ¼ sijoijΘðoij − θÞ [S17]
(since only connected actors, for which sij ¼ 1, can interact). In
general, a specific choice of the social network can change the
results significantly. However, in our case we have no indication
about the structure of the network (recall that the individuals are
carefully chosen in such a way that they do not know each other,
and our aim is to study what happens if they start interacting
either on-line or offline). Therefore we must consider networks
generated according to some model. This leads us to two possi-
bilities. As a first choice, we could assume that the network is
formed according to some stochastic rule which is completely in-
dependent of the cultural vectors [e.g. a regular lattice, a random
graph, a small-world model, a scale-free network, etc. (22)]. As a
second choice, we could assume that the network is formed with a
dependence on the cultural vectors. In particular, we could ex-
ploit the well documented result that neighbors in a social net-
work tend to be culturally similar: homophily is found not only
to strengthen the existing social contacts (giving higher probability
of social influence to more culturally similar actors as in the
Axelrod model), but also to give a higher probability of formation
of social contacts.
In both cases, the correct way to proceed would be to average
the results over several realizations of the same network model.
This means that there are now two averages to perform, one with
respect to the opinion dynamics of the Axelrod model (as we did
so far on the complete graph) and one with respect to the network
formation rule. There are two possible ways, which in principle
can lead to different results, to combine these averages. One is by
considering network formation as what is technically called a
quenched disorder: for a given network realization, the average
over the dynamics is performed; then a different network realiza-
tion and the corresponding dynamical average are obtained, and
so on until the dynamical averages for all network realizations are
performed, and finally averaged at the end. Another way is by
considering network formation as an annealed disorder, i.e., by
performing the average over network realizations first. The latter
choice is simpler to characterize mathematically, because it re-
moves the correlations induced by a fixed network structure. It
represents a mean-field approximation to the results obtained
in the quenched case. As we now show, many of the differences
(with respect to our complete-graph choice) that would arise for a
single realization of a network model are washed away after aver-
aging (in the annealed sense) over network realizations.
In the annealed case, the probability pij appearing in Eq. S17 is
effectively replaced by the quantity ~pij ¼ hpiji where h·i denotes
an ensemble average over the possible realizations of the net-
work. The ensemble average has effect only on sij and leads us
to the probability
~pij ¼ hpiji ¼ hsijioijΘðoij − θÞ [S18]
where hsiji is the probability that, under the network model con-
sidered, the vertices i and j are connected. If we assume that the
network model has no dependence on the cultural vector (the
first of the two options discussed above), hsiji is nothing but
the average link density s produced by the network model con-
sidered, and is therefore a constant (uniquely determined by
the choice of parameters in the network model) independent
of i and j. For instance, for the Erdős-Rényi random graph model,
s ¼ hsiji is simply the probability that any two vertices are con-
nected. Therefore Eq. S18 becomes equivalent to Eq. S16, with
f ðoijÞ ¼ s · oij [S19]
which is an increasing function of oij. Therefore we can replicate
our arguments above to conclude that, for ultrametric data, our
results would be unaffected by this choice. If we consider the sec-
ond option, i.e., a network model that depends on the cultural
vectors and gives higher connection probability to pairs of actors
with larger overlap, then hsiji is exactly such probability and is
therefore an increasing function gðoijÞ of oij. This implies that,
again, Eq. S18 becomes equivalent to Eq. S16 where now
f ðoijÞ ¼ gðoijÞoij [S20]
which is still an increasing function of oij. Therefore the above
arguments hold in this case as well, and we can conclude that
in the annealed case the specification of different network topol-
ogies will leave the complete-graph results unaffected. With
quenched disorder, we may obtain different results which would
require a more detailed investigation, but this goes beyond the
scope of the present work. Simulations of a different model of
unidimensional opinion dynamics with bounded confidence (4)
have revealed a high degree of robustness for various quenched
network topologies, as we found here in the annealed case.
Networks coevolving with opinions. One can regard annealed dis-
order as a scenario where the social network evolves much faster
than cultural dynamics (so that the average over different net-
works is carried out first), and quenched disorder as the opposite
case where the cultural process is much faster than the evolution
of the social network (and the average over cultural dynamics is
carried out first). A very interesting intermediate case, which
has been suggested to be more realistic than both extremes
(17, 24–27), is when cultural dynamics and network evolution
take place at a comparable rate. This case leads to a mechanism
of coevolution between cultural traits and social network struc-
ture (17, 24, 25, 27). According to such mechanism, social ties
between actors who become culturally dissimilar are constantly
removed and randomly replaced, so that a feedback between dy-
namics and topology (26) is introduced. Usually, this is imple-
mented by assuming that actors redirect their ties—from
former neighbors that are eventually found at an exceedingly long
cultural distance, to new neighbors that are selected randomly
among all actors. This process implies that, apart from the total
number of ties, the network progressively loses memory of its in-
itial condition (e.g., a lattice or other model specification as
above) and becomes entirely determined by cultural traits (17)
[or any other variable responsible for the creation of links
(26)]. This leads exactly to our results on a complete graph,
the only quantitative differences being the density of links (which
in our case is not constrained by the initial topology) and the
overlap threshold θ (which in our case spans the full range
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, while in some models is fixed to zero as in the original
Axelrod model). The second difference simply implies that other
parameter choices are automatically included in our model as
particular cases. The first difference implies that, if the coevolu-
tion process starts from a network with link density s < 1 (instead
of s ¼ 1 as in our case), then Eq. S15 must be effectively (in a
sense similar to the annealed-disorder case) replaced by Eq. S16
with f ðoijÞ given by Eq. S19. Again, this means that our results are
robust to this modification. So we find that, after controlling for
the overall link density, our choice of a complete graph for the
Valori et al. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1109514109 8 of 13
social network can also be viewed as a particular asymptotic (i.e.,
after the memory of the initial state is lost) implementation of
coevolving models with rewiring of ties.
Cultural drift. It is also interesting to discuss the stability of our
results after the introduction of cultural drift, which is usually
modeled as a spontaneous and random change in the cultural
traits of individuals, taking place continuously with a given noise
rate (28, 29). While cultural drift usually has counterintuitive and
destabilizing consequences (17, 28, 29), we expect that in this case
ultrametricity will severely suppress such effects. To see this, we
note that it is unreasonable to assume that, on the same time scale
over which influence and homophily take place, cultural drift can
move the opinion vectors by more than the confidence threshold
ω. This would imply that actors continuously and spontaneously
perform a “schizophrenic” change to a previously unaccepted
opinion. Therefore the only reasonable range of noise rate must
be such that, between two interactions among actors, the average
distance by which cultural vectors have drifted is much smaller
than ω. But such process would affect the dendrogram only below
the height ω, and we therefore predict no substantial effects of
cultural drift, as in the other cases we have discussed. By protect-
ing the dynamics from noise, the introduction of the threshold
θ ¼ 1 − ω appears again to reduce the effects of additional model
parameters and specifications, and to ensure that our results are
directly interpretable in terms of the empirical properties of cul-
tural data.
Higher-order interactions.We now discuss qualitatively the effect of
adding higher-order (nondyadic) interactions (5, 21) to the actor-
actor cultural dynamics. Such interactions require that groups of
three, four, or more individuals interact simultaneously and col-
lectively converge culturally. The dynamics of the Axelrod model,
if extended to triadic interactions, would prescribe that groups of
three actors (say i, j, k) interact with a probability pijk which is
some function f ð ~vi; ~vj; ~vkÞ of the vectors ~vi, ~vj, ~vk. After this inter-
action, the three actors will have a cultural feature in common,
i.e., vðlÞi ¼ vðlÞj ¼ vðlÞk , for some component l where their vectors
previously differed. Adding the bounded confidence mechanism
to this dynamics implies that the interaction is possible only if the
three vectors are closer to one another than a certain threshold.
More specifically, if θ2 ≡ θ denotes the usual (overlap) threshold
for dyadic interactions, triadic interactions introduce an addi-
tional threshold θ3 such that they take place with probability
pijk ¼ f ð ~vi; ~vj; ~vkÞΘðoij − θ3ÞΘðojk − θ3ÞΘðoki − θ3Þ: [S21]
Similarly, fourth-order interactions would involve a threshold θ4
which only allows convergence if all pairs within a group of four
actors mutually overlap by more than θ4, and so on for fifth- and
higher-order interactions.
In principle, all such thresholds θ3;θ4;… represent additional
free parameters that might expand the phase space into regions
with very different outcomes. However, to be realistic, higher-or-
der interactions must be individually weaker than lower-order
ones. To see this, consider again the case of triadic interactions.
Their introduction adds an extra triadic probability of interaction
pijk on top of the combination of three dyadic interactions with
probabilities pij, pjk, pki. As the order of the interaction increases,
the extra probabilities should be smaller and smaller, i.e. they
should be corrections to the lower-order terms, otherwise one
would be conceiving a system where it is increasingly more prob-
able to engage in larger and larger (culturally influential) group
interactions. Similarly, the confidence threshold θk for kth order
interactions should not be such that individuals become paradoxi-
cally more and more open to an opinion change simply because
the size of the group they are temporarily interacting with in-
creases. This means that one should choose the values of the
overlap thresholds in such a way that
θ2 ≥ θ3 ≥ θ4 ≥ …: [S22]
In terms of the distance thresholds ωk ¼ 1 − θk, this reads
ω2 ≤ ω3 ≤ ω4 ≤ …: [S23]
If we interpret bounded confidence as an intrinsic tendency of
individuals to be open to influences only within an absolute cul-
tural distance, irrespective of the order of the interactions where
it is involved, then we could set ω2 ¼ ω3 ¼ ω4 ¼ … in the above
equation. However, since this is quite open to different interpre-
tations, in what follows we will not make this additional assump-
tion and we will consider the more general case. Note that for
ultrametric cultural vectors Eq. S23 implies that, if ω2 is our usual
height at which we cut the dendrogram into disconnected
branches, the introduction of the entire hierarchy of higher-order
interactions will only affect cultural convergence within such
branches, again with no mixing across different branches. In more
detail, let us denote as ω-branch a branch produced by cutting the
dendrogram at the height ω. An argument similar to the one we
have used in the case of dyadic interactions implies that, if only
kth order interactions were present and if the vectors were ultra-
metric, then the number of final cultural domains would be es-
sentially the initial number of ωk-branches, since each of the
latter would eventually merge into a single cultural vector.
Now, Eq. S23 implies that, if k > h, then the ωk-branches
(affected by higher-order interactions) are nested within the
ωh-branches (affected by lower-order interactions). This shows
that even the simultaneous introduction of all higher-order inter-
actions can only affect the order and speed of convergence of
subbranches nested within the ω2-branches. Surprisingly, this
would leave our original result, obtained with only dyadic inter-
actions, unaffected. As all other mechanisms we have considered
so far, this remarkable stability of the outcome of cultural dy-
namics is entirely due to the ultrametricity of real data.
External sources of information. We conclude our list of more so-
phisticated scenarios with a discussion of the effects of an expo-
sure of individuals to external sources of information (such as
media, newspapers, etc.) (30). Such effects are more difficult
to control, due to a greater freedom in the definition of models
capturing the relevant mechanism. We can however tremen-
dously simplify the discussion by focusing on a particular case
which we expect to be the relevant one for the present case study.
In the subsection “The Eurobarometer dataset” of this SI file we
argued that the main external sources of information are in our
case mass media equally accessible by the entire population,
rather than by specialized niches. This leads us to the expectation
that any further convergence, on top of actor-actor interactions,
of the cultural vectors can be to a large extent approximated by a
sort of background convergence reducing all cultural distances
gradually and homogeneously. We can model this additional pro-
cess as follows. Imagine that we “switch off” (dyadic or higher-
order) actor-actor interactions, and let the vectors gradually con-
verge under the only effect of external information. In our as-
sumptions, this occurs homogeneously in cultural space, so
that the net approximate effect is a temporal reduction of all dis-
tances dij: if dijð0Þ denotes the initial distance between vectors ~vi
and ~vj, after a time t all distances will be
dijðtÞ ≈ cðtÞdijð0Þ ∀ i;j [S24]
where the positive function cðtÞ, which embodies the temporal
dynamics, must decrease as t increases, and be such that
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cð0Þ ¼ 1. Therefore 0 ≤ cðtÞ ≤ 1. We do not need any further as-
sumption on the form of cðtÞ, since what is important is that it
produces a background convergence that can be easily controlled
for as follows. If we “switch on” actor-actor interactions, then the
background convergence has the effect, at any time t, of replacing
oijðtÞ ¼ 1 − dijðtÞ with ~oijðtÞ ¼ 1 − cðtÞdijðtÞ ¼ 1 − cðtÞ þ cðtÞoijðtÞ
into Eq. S15. Dropping the time-dependence in the notation,
the effective probability of interaction would become
~pij ¼ ~oijΘð ~oij − θÞ ¼ ð1 − cþ coijÞΘð1 − cþ coij − θÞ
¼ f ðoijÞΘðoij − ~θÞ [S25]
where
f ðoijÞ ¼ 1 − cþ coij [S26]
is an increasing function of oij, and
~θ ¼ θ þ c − 1
c
[S27]
is a transformed threshold. Equation S25 is equivalent to Eq. S16,
apart from the presence of ~θ instead of θ. This simply means that
the results one would recover in this case are equivalent to the
results we obtained with a different value of the threshold. In par-
ticular, the quantities we obtain for a given value ω of the overlap
threshold would be replaced by the quantities we obtain for the
transformed threshold
~w ¼ 1 − ~θ ¼ ω
c
[S28]
as simple intuition would suggest. Therefore, the addition of ex-
ternal information can, under our assumptions motivated by this
specific case study, be simply reabsorbed in a redefinition of the
only parameter of the modified Axelrod model.
In all the extensions we have considered in this concluding sec-
tion, it appears that the introduction of bounded confidence in
terms of a cultural threshold, besides being important in itself
for the theoretical reasons we discussed, makes the surprising ef-
fects of ultrametricity particularly evident. In particular, it has the
advantage of freeing the results from otherwise arbitrary specifi-
cations (and additional free parameters) of the dynamical model.
This allows us to obtain clearly interpretable outcomes in terms of
the single parameter θ, even when considering quite complicated
settings.
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Fig. S1. Color plots of interopinion correlation matrices ρðk;lÞα for the Germany group. (A) real data. (B) shuffled data.
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A Real
B Shuffled C Random
Fig. S2. Dendrograms resulting from the application of an average linkage clustering algorithm to the cultural vectors f ~vig, represented as leaves of the tree





















































Fig. S3. Local and global measures of influence in cultural graphs obtained from real and randomized data. (A) Fraction of direct influential interactions (link
density) fα as a function of the threshold ω. (B) Fraction of the largest connected component sα emerging from indirect influential interactions as a function of
ω. (C) Link density fα as a function of the rescaled threshold z≡ ðω − μαÞ∕σα. The black solid line is the cumulative density function (CDF) of the standard










































































Fig. S4. Critical thresholds representing resistance to collective behavior of the sampled groups (for real, shuffled, and random data). For real data, the values
of ωc are not consistent with each other within the error bars, indicating different resistances to coordination across the sampled groups. They are however
always smaller than randomized data, indicating that the empirical ultrametric distribution in cultural space systematically facilitates the onset of collective
behavior.






























Fig. S5. The ultrametric properties of real opinions constrain the evolution of cultural convergence even for infinite-range interactions in social space. (A) The
average number hNDiω of cultural domains obtained in the final state of the Axelrod model as a function of ω, when the initial state is given by real, shuffled,
and random opinions. (B) The average number hNDi of final cultural domains versus the number NC of initial connected components in the cultural graphs, for
real, shuffled, and random opinions.
Table S1. Average (μα) and standard deviation (σα), for real and shuffled data, of intervector
distances for the 12 groups sampled from European countries (α ¼ 1, 12; alphabetical order) plus
the group sampled across Europe (α ¼ 13) and the set of uniformly random data (α ¼ 14)
α Country μα;real μα;shuffled σα;real σα;shuffled
1 Belgium 0.299 0.299 0.052 0.024
2 Denmark 0.307 0.307 0.054 0.025
3 France 0.303 0.303 0.050 0.025
4 Germany 0.295 0.295 0.054 0.024
5 Greece 0.286 0.286 0.059 0.024
6 Ireland 0.295 0.295 0.057 0.024
7 Italy 0.295 0.295 0.052 0.024
8 Luxembourg 0.304 0.304 0.051 0.024
9 Netherlands 0.297 0.297 0.051 0.025
10 Portugal 0.287 0.287 0.067 0.024
11 Spain 0.298 0.298 0.058 0.024
12 UK 0.292 0.292 0.053 0.024
13 Europe 0.304 0.304 0.053 0.025
14 Random 0.445 0.445 0.027 0.027
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